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CAUSATION, COUNTERFACTUALS AND PROBABILITIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY AND LEGAL THINKING
FLORENCE G’SELL1
Determining whether the law could and should have its own definition 
of causation which would be based solely on its own logic and objectives 
and would stay independent of philosophical or scientific accounts is a 
nagging question.2 Whatever the answer may be, one must admit that law 
and philosophy share the same difficulty in defining causation. This diffi-
culty is so acute that, in both disciplines, “anyone familiar with the causa-
tion debate as it has been conducted in recent years will be familiar with a 
vast range of theories and counterexamples, which collectively can lead 
one to suspect that no univocal analysis of the concept of causation is pos-
sible.”3 Therefore, it seems appropriate in both contexts, while faced with 
such a large number of approaches, to assess the various accounts of causa-
tion with a certain criteria of adequacy.4
In this respect, philosophy and law have necessarily different stand-
ards. Certainly, it may be argued that philosophy should privilege, in as-
sessing the various approaches of causation, the criteria of coherence, 
agreement with common-sense intuition and compatibility with contempo-
rary science.5 However the law engages in types of inquiry that are based 
on interrogations which may lead to favor other standards. It has been as-
serted that, while philosophers do not seem to agree on which underlying 
interrogation their approaches refer to, “lawyers should explicitly choose 
just one interrogation to underlie causal usage in law so that it is clear what 
information we are reporting when we use causal language for legal pur-
1. I am very much indebted to Professor Richard Wright for reviewing and commenting on this 
piece. May he be warmly thanked for it. 
2. See Antony Honoré, Causation in the Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter ed. 2010),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/ (asking “whether and to what extent 
causation in legal contexts differs from causation outside the law, for example in science or everyday 
life . . . .”); see also FLORENCE G’SELL-MACREZ, RECHERCHES SUR LA NOTION DE CAUSALITÉ (2005) 
(University of Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne). 
3. Introduction to THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION 1 (Helen Beebee et al. eds., 2009).
4. Max Kistler, Analysing Causation in Light of Intuitions, Causal Statements, and Science, in
CAUSATION IN GRAMMATICAL STRUCTURES 79 (Bridget Copley & Fabienne Martin eds., 2015).
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poses.”6 Within this context, such an interrogation should be chosen “to 
serve the wide projects of the law” which is mainly interested in “identi-
fy[ing] when a specified factor was ‘involved’ in the existence of a particu-
lar phenomenon.”7
In any case, it is beyond dispute that law and philosophy have much in 
common while addressing the notion of cause which is—in both disci-
plines—“a multiple-purpose tool.”8 Yet certain functions of causation 
emerge both in the legal and philosophical contexts. Above all, the notion 
of cause serves to explain how a certain situation came about: in this re-
spect, the function of causation is backward-looking and explanatory.9
Another function is attributive: causation is used to fix the extent of re-
sponsibility of agents. The last function of the notion of cause that can be 
identified is to predict what will happen from a forward-looking perspec-
tive.10 While this last function is probably less prominent in the law, the 
others are common to law and philosophy. This circumstance explains why 
the various approaches of causation in the law appear to be, in many re-
spects, the extension of philosophical developments.
The purpose of this contribution will thus be to present, very shortly 
and modestly, the major approaches analyzing the notion of cause in con-
temporary philosophy before turning to the main legal theories of causa-
tion. Such an overview purports to bring to light the obvious links between 
law and philosophy concerning causation thinking.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES OF CAUSATION
The current leading theories of causation in the contemporary philo-
sophical landscape may be roughly divided into three major conceptions. 
The first one is based on the related but distinct ideas of regularity or in-
stantiation of natural laws and is often presented as the deductive nomolog-
ical (DN) conception of causation. The second one is counterfactual and 
the third is a probabilistic conception of causal links. Whereas the first two 
theories are based on the Humean-Millian account of causation, the third 
one results from the development of probabilistic thinking in the recent 
period.
6. Jane Stapleton, Causation in the Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra 
note 3, at 1224.
7. Id.
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Before presenting successively those three approaches, it should be 
stated at the outset that other recent but less debated theories exist and will 
not be discussed here, such as the attempt to characterize causation in terms 
of “continuous process and interaction between them” (causal process theo-
ries)11 or the concept of manipulation (agency and interventionist theo-
ries).12
A. The Regularity/Covering Law View of Causation13
According to David Hume, causal judgments are based on the experi-
ence of regularities. He states, “We may define a cause to be an object 
precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling 
the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those 
objects that resemble the latter.”14 In other words, events that are like the 
cause are regularly followed by events like the effect.
From this perspective, regularity theories tend to define causation in 
terms of subsumption under uniformly experienced regularities. This means 
that singular causal judgments are not based on direct perception of powers 
or forces but founded on the belief that a certain succession of events in-
stantiates one (or more) experienced regularities.
John Stuart Mill converted Hume’s regularity account, which was 
skeptical regarding the actual existence of causal laws, into an empiricist 
covering law version of what is today called the nomological account of 
causation. He argued that a cause is an antecedent set of conditions which 
is minimally sufficient for the occurrence of the effect.15 Mill distinguished 
the positive factors from the negative conditions, the absence of which is 
necessary for the effect. To Mill, the cause is, philosophically speaking, the 
sum total of the conditions positive and negative taken together.16 In other 
words, a fully described causal law would list all the conditions that togeth-
er are necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of a certain consequence.
11. Phil Dowe, Causal Process Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note 
3, at 360–95.
12. James E. Woodward, Agency and Interventionist Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CAUSATION, supra note 3, at 396–440. 
13. Stathis Psillos, Regularity Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note 
3, at 230–75. 
14. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 173–94 (2012) (ebook).
15. JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE (CosmoClassic 
2008) (1843); Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual Baselines, 40
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1181, 1181–1267 (2003); Psillos, supra note 13, at 243–45.
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In modern philosophy, causal explanation has been assimilated to the 
“deductive-nomological” (DN) conception of causation17 presented by C. 
Hempel and P. Oppenheim in their seminal article Studies in the Logic of 
Explanation.18 According to this approach, one event c is the cause of an-
other event e, if and only if there is a law of nature that connects events like 
c with events like e. Although it has been subject to much criticism since 
the 1960s, the DN model remains one of the major approaches to the analy-
sis of causation.19
One of the major difficulties with regularity and covering law theo-
ries arises from the fact that regularities and empirically based causal laws 
(better described as causal generalizations since they are almost never fully 
described) are imperfect.20 Causal conditions may not be invariably fol-
lowed by their effects. For example, smoking is a cause of lung cancer but 
some smokers do not develop lung cancer. On the contrary, as Mill recog-
nized, a specific effect may result from various different sets of factors, 
which is called the problem of “heterogeneity of circumstances”21: lung 
cancer may result from smoking, but also from a genetic susceptibility or 
exposure to asbestos. Furthermore, contemporary science has shown that 
causal laws are not invariable: the universe is not deterministic.
B. Counterfactual Theory
The counterfactual approach is based on David Hume’s second remark 
about causation.22 Hume maintained that causation was based on the expe-
rience of regularities but he also added that a causal link was established 
“where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.”23
This second definition expressed a relationship of strict necessity between 
two events: the first object or event had to be strictly necessary for the oc-
currence of the second, in the sense that the second could never occur in the 
17. James Woodward, Scientific Explanation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 2, at 1–2, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/scientific-explanation/.
18. Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim, Studies in the Logic of Explanation, J. PHIL. SCI. ASSOC.
135, 136–40 (1948); See Psillos, supra note 13, at 259–62.
19. Woodward, supra note 17, at 2.
20. Christopher Hitchcock, Probabilistic Causation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2, at 1.1,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/causation-probabilistic/.
21. Id.
22. Peter Menzies, Counterfactual Theories of Causation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/causation-counterfactual/.
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absence of the first.24 Although this counterfactual definition was very 
different from the first definition,25 Hume never explored this second per-
spective.
It was not until the late 1960s that sophisticated counterfactual ap-
proaches of causation were developed.26 The best known and most thor-
oughly elaborated counterfactual theory of causation is David Lewis’s 
theory,27 exposed in his 1973 seminal article, Causation.28 In Lewis’s theo-
ry, causal relations are analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence 
between two actual events. The event e causally depends on the event c if
the counterfactual statement “if event c had not occurred, event e would not 
have occurred” is true. In this perspective, a counterfactual conditional is a 
conditional sentence, whose antecedent is contrary-to-fact. In Lewis’s 
words, “We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the 
difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened 
without it. Had it been absent, its effects — some of them, at least, and 
usually all — would have been absent as well.”29
In Lewis’s perspective, asserting that a counterfactual statement is true 
implies to rely on similarity relations between possible worlds. “One world 
is said to be closer to actuality than another if the first resembles the actual 
world more than the second does.”30 In this perspective, the counterfactual 
“If Mr. Gourlain had not smoked he would not suffer from cancer” is true if
and only if some world where Mr. Gourlain does not smoke and is in good 
shape is closer to the actual world than is any world where Mr. Gourlain 
does not smoke and suffers from cancer. The possible world analysis relies 
on causal laws to assess the necessity of a condition for the occurrence of 
the effect.31 Although some proponents of the counterfactual approach, as 
Lewis, explicitly rely on causal laws, others appear to reject any reasoning 
based on causal laws or generalization and favor a singular causation ap-
proach that focuses on the most similar possible world in specific circum-
24. Richard W. Wright & Ingeborg Puppe, Causation: Linguistic, Philosophical, Legal and 
Economic, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461, 465 (2016).
25. However, it is possible to read this second definition as plainly restating the first one. See
MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND 
METAPHYSICS 399 (2009).
26. L.A. Paul, Counterfactual Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note 
3, at 276.
27. The analysis of J.L. Mackie, which is developed in the Chapter 2 of his book, can also be 
mentioned. See J.L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION 2958 (1974).
28. David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556 (1973).
29. Id. at 557.
30. Menzies, supra note 22, at 2.1.
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stances.32 In any case, since counterfactual conditionals refer to particular 
events at particular times, the counterfactual approach is considered as a 
theory of singular instances of causation rather than of causal laws.33 Lew-
is agrees with Mill that the second event may occur in the absence of the 
first, contrary to Hume’s apparent assumption. For a condition to be a 
cause, it need not be always necessary for the occurrence of the effect 
(strict necessity), but rather only necessary for the occurrence of the effect 
in the specific singular instance (strong necessity).34
In 1986, Lewis presented a probabilistic extension to his original 
counterfactual theory of causation35 in order to take into account the fact 
that probabilistic processes are widespread in the actual world. In this view, 
causal dependence can be expressed as follows: if Mr. Gourlain had not 
smoked, his probability of developing lung cancer would have been much 
less than its actual chance.
Nevertheless, defining causation in terms of causal dependence raises 
various difficulties. First, if any event but for an effect would not have 
occurred is a cause, the theory may generate some absurd results. For ex-
ample, it is easy to assert that an injury would not have occurred if the vic-
tim or the tortfeasor were never born. This is why Herbert Hart and Tony 
Honoré tried to develop a distinction between causes and background con-
ditions which common sense, in their opinion, usually draws. According to 
Hart and Honoré, common sense distinguishes spontaneously between 
causes and “mere circumstances”36: the torfeasor’s birth is a background 
condition whereas the torfeasor’s act is a cause. Such a distinction is made 
by referring to the context of the inquiry: for example, tort law raises ques-
tions of personal liability. The distinction also relies on the context of the 
effect’s occurrence.37 However, Lewis himself never made such a distinc-
tion.
32. Moore, supra note 15, at 1195.
33. L.A. Paul, Counterfactual Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note 
3, at 276–77.
34. Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 111–13. The distinction between strict, strong and weak 
senses of necessity and sufficiency was established by Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility,
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts,
73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1039 (1988).
35. See David Lewis, Causal Explanation, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS II 214–40 (1st ed. 1987).  
36. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 72 (2d ed. 1985).
37. See id. at 33 (“The line between cause and mere condition is in fact drawn by common sense 
on principles which vary in a subtle and complex way, both with the type of causal question at issue and 
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Second, the theory does not solve the issues created by causal overde-
termination, that is preemptive causation38 and duplicative causation.39 In 
cases of preemptive causation, the effect would have been produced even if 
the actual cause had not occurred because another causal factor would have 
occurred and produced it. For example, Mr. X died in a traffic accident but 
he was already suffering from a fatal disease and would have died anyway, 
thus it would be inaccurate to assert that Mr. X would not have died but for 
the car accident. In duplicative causation cases, two events jointly caused 
the effect but both of them would have caused it alone if the other event 
had not occurred. For example, Mr. X was shot in the head by two bullets, 
each of which was sufficient to kill him.
In order to deal with such cases, Lewis developed the notion of chains 
of causal dependence. According to Lewis, event c causes event e if and 
only if there is a chain of intermediate events c, c1, c2, . . ., e, so that each 
event in the chain depends counterfactually on its predecessor.40 By defin-
ing causation in terms of stepwise counterfactual dependence, Lewis is thus 
able to distinguish the preempting actual cause (the car accident) from the 
preempted potential cause (the fatal disease). There is a causal chain run-
ning from the car accident to the death, but no such chain running from the 
disease to the death. Nevertheless, the reasoning in terms of chains of caus-
al dependence cannot deal satisfactorily with certain preemption cases, like 
cases of “late preemption”41 where the effect resulted from the actual cause 
before the preempted cause could produce anything. For example, Mr. X
was injured in a collision with A’s car, but Mr. X’s car would have later 
collided with B’s car if the first collision with A’s car had not occurred. In 
other words, the alternative process (collision with B) is cut short after the 
main process (collision with A) has actually brought the effect. In such a 
case, there is no causal dependence between the collision with A’s car and 
the injury, because there would have been an accident due to collision with 
B even if there was no collision with A.
In 2000, Lewis presented a last version of his theory that develops the 
notion of “influence”.42 Influence corresponds to “counterfactuals that are 
sensitive to a wide range of characteristics, such that, had C not occurred 
just as it actually did, E would not have occurred just as it actually did. The 
final version of the view defended by Lewis is the thesis that, if whether, 
38. Paul, supra note 26, at 298–99.
39. Id. at 306–07.
40. Lewis, supra note 28, at 563.
41. Menzies, supra note 22, at ¶ 3.4.
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when, and how C occurs influences to a suitable degree whether, when, and 
how E occurs, C is a cause of E.”43 Another way to put it is to say that an 
event c causes the event e if there is a “chain of influence” from c to e.
C. Probabilistic Approaches of Causation
Probabilistic theories of causation44 are generally presented as a major 
alternative to the regularity approach that are intended to draw the conse-
quences of indeterminism. Hans Reichenbach45 was the first author to pro-
vide a comprehensive epistemological account of causal relationships 
based on probabilities. Nowadays, probabilistic theories of causality have 
reached a wider audience and their expansion was accompanied by an in-
creased mathematization of causality.46 In the probabilistic approach, caus-
es are seen as raising the probability of their effects. In other words, “(1) 
changing a cause makes a difference to its effects, and (2) this difference-
making shows up in probabilistic dependencies between cause and ef-
fect.”47 Many proponents of probabilistic theories maintain that “probabil-
istic dependencies characterize the causal relation, i.e. provide necessary 
and sufficient conditions for causal connection, of the form: C causes E if 
and only if appropriate probabilistic dependencies obtain.”48
Probabilistic theories of causation interpret probabilities objectively, 
which means that they see probabilities as expressing frequencies that are 
objective features of the world, as opposed to subjective probabilities 
which express the degree of an individual’s personal belief in the likelihood 
of a causal link. These theories are sometimes presented as theories of sin-
gular causation relating specific events and sometimes referred to as theo-
ries of general causation relating types of events.49
In the probabilistic account of general causation, the cause c raises the 
probability of its effect e, which means that the probability that smokers 
43. Paul, supra note 26, at 304.
44. Hitchcock, supra note 20; Jon Williamson, Probabilistic Theories, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note 3, at 318–59.
45. Williamson, supra, note 44, at 321–25. Proponents of probabilities theories of causality 
include: HANS REICHENBACH, THE DIRECTION OF TIME (Maria Reichenbach ed., 1971); RICHARD E.
NEAPOLITAN, PROBABILISTIC REASONING IN EXPERT SYSTEMS: THEORY AND ALGORITHMS (1990); 
JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE (2d ed. 2000); PATRICK SUPPES, A
PROBABILISTIC THEORY OF CAUSALITY (1970); I.J. Good, A Theory of Causality, 9 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI.
307 (1959); Hans Reichenbach, The Principle of Causality and the Possibility of its Empirical Confir-
mation, in MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 109 (Keegan Paul ed., 1959); Wesley C. Salmon, Proba-
bilistic Causality, 61 PACIFIC PHIL. Q. 50 (1980).
46. Williamson, supra note 44, at 330.
47. Id. at 320.
48. Id. at 320–21.
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develop lung cancer is higher than the probability of suffering from lung 
cancer in general. It also means, in other words, that the probability, for a 
smoker, of suffering from lung cancer, is higher than the probability, for a 
non-smoker, of suffering from lung cancer.
Such approaches are compatible with imperfect regularities: A may 
raise the probability of B even though A is not invariably followed by B. 
Moreover, this approach is not threatened by the problem of heterogeneity
of circumstances. In other words, smoking is a cause of lung cancer, not 
because all smokers develop lung cancer, but because smokers are more 
likely to develop lung cancer than non-smokers. This is also consistent with 
there being some smokers who avoid lung cancer, and some non-smokers 
who die from lung cancer.
As other theories do, the probabilistic account faces counterexamples. 
One counterexample is the case where an actual causal relationship estab-
lished by our physical knowledge is not accompanied by the raising of 
probabilities.50 Raising of probabilities is also absent in cases of causal 
preemption. For example, Mr. X had a traffic accident resulting in a 60% 
chance of death. However, Mr. X was already suffering from a fatal disease 
that caused a 90% chance of death. Here, the actual cause preempted a 
stronger cause, but it lowered the victim’s chance of death from 90% to 
60%. Furthermore, it may happen that a given factor raises the probability 
of an outcome without causing it. In view of those counterexamples, some 
authors advocate a pluralistic account of causality according to which caus-
al relationships are sometimes probabilistic and sometimes not.51
II. MAIN APPROACHES OF CAUSATION IN LEGAL THINKING
The prevailing approaches to the question of causation in the law ap-
pear to be directly inspired by philosophical thinking. This is why the clas-
sification used to present those theories will be roughly similar to the one 
used in the first part of this article. However, the counterfactual approach 
will be studied first, since it seems to have developed before the emergence 
of the regularity and probabilistic views of causation.
A. Counterfactual Approach of Causation in the Law
The idea that a cause must be a condition that “made a difference” by 
being necessary for the occurrence of the consequence, in the sense that 
50. Williamson, supra note 44, at 339–44.
51. Id. at 342; See, e.g., Ned Hall, Two Concepts of Causation, in CAUSATION AND 
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without it the consequence would not have occurred on the particular occa-
sion, is widely shared in various legal systems. In common law countries, it 
takes the form of the “but for test” while in civil law countries it underlies 
the theory of the equivalence of conditions. In both common law and civil 
law jurisdictions, the but for test is usually assumed to require a hypothet-
ical counterfactual analysis.
1. The “But for Test” in Common Law Countries
In common law countries, the causal relationship that must be estab-
lished in order to make someone liable in negligence is typically described 
as the “but for test”.52 Although some commentators argue that the but for 
test does not need to be applied as a hypothetical possible worlds analy-
sis,53 this test is often presented as expressing a relationship of counterfac-
tual dependence. Whether described factually or counterfactually, under the 
“but for” test, a defendant is a cause of the plaintiff’s harm if and only if, 
had the defendant not acted tortiously (or negligently), the plaintiff would 
not have been injured.54 The but for test is deployed in most common law 
jurisdictions and is used by courts and juries to determine what is called 
“actual” or “factual” causation. Generally, other requirements are imposed 
by the law, like the fact that the link between the defendant’s negligence 
and the plaintiff ’s harm is direct or proximate.
The but for test is subject to difficulties already discussed which are 
specific to counterfactual approaches. The test produces counterintuitive 
results, especially in cases of causal overdetermination.55 For example, in 
duplicative causation situations, where two (or more) distinct causes joined
to cause the damage, but each of them was sufficient to produce it alone. In 
those cases, neither factor can be treated as a but for cause given the exist-
ence of another factor which was sufficient to produce the harm. The same 
issue is raised in alternative causation cases. In the classic example of two 
defendants simultaneously shooting at and hitting the deceased with fatal 
shots, the but for test yields the implausible conclusion that neither has 
caused the harm.
These problems have led some commentators to suggest the aban-
donment of the but for test. Some of them have advanced a substantial-
52. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36, at 15, 16, 69, 110; See also Richard W. Wright, Causation 
in Tort Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1775 (1985).
53. Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 114–15.
54. Robert N. Strassfeld, If. . .: Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339, 345
(1992).
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factor criterion under which the defendant’s conduct is a cause of the harm 
if it is a “substantial factor” in producing that harm.56 The substantial factor 
criterion was adopted in the First and Second Restatement of Torts to en-
compass both but for causes and cases in which multiple “actively operat-
ing forces” were each independently sufficient (along with shared 
“background” conditions) to produce the harm.57 However, due to its ques-
tion-begging nature, the Restatement (Third) of Torts has abandoned the 
notion of “substantial factor” and now refers to the NESS criterion for cas-
es of causal overdetermination in the comments to (but not the actual text) 
of section 27, while providing in section 26 that “conduct is a factual cause 
of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”
2. The Theory of the Equivalence of the Conditions in Civil Law 
Countries
The theory of the equivalence of the conditions stems from both the 
empiricist tradition of Hume and Mill and the further reflection of German 
authors.58 Indeed, since there was little theoretical reflection on causation 
in French doctrinal writing during the period immediately following the 
adoption of the Civil Code, it was only through the influence of German 
literature that, during the latter part of nineteenth century, French commen-
tators gained exposure to theories of causation.
The starting point of the theory of the equivalence of the conditions is 
the classic observation that a fully described causal law lists all the condi-
tions that together are necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of a cer-
tain consequence. According to the German theorist Maximilian von
Büri,59 since it is impossible to specify the exact share of each condition in 
the production of the result, every factor should be considered as a cause. 
Von Büri justified this assertion by the fact that the ultimate result is indi-
visible. Franz von Liszt60 also believed that, since all conditions are neces-
sary to produce the result, they are, therefore, inevitably equivalent. 
Therefore, according to the theory of the equivalence of the conditions, 
every condition of an injury can be considered a cause. In this respect, the 
56. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 234–35 (1930); LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE 
CAUSE (1927). 
57. “if two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor’s negligence, the other not 
because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the 
actor’s negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
58. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36, at 431.
59. M VON BÜRI, DIE KAUSALITÄT UND IHRE STRAFRECHTLICHEN BEZIEHUNGEN (Stuttgart 
1885).
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theory of the equivalence of the conditions is often thought to lead to the 
classic counterfactual approach to causation. Another way to state the theo-
ry is to say that, since all the conditions are equivalent, every condition 
without which the effect would not have occurred is considered a cause. 
Causation is thus established through a test of counterfactual dependence 
that is roughly analogous to the but for test.
The theory of the equivalence of the conditions has been criticized in 
French commentary for not offering any method to select the cause among 
the conditions that have combined to produce the damage.61 It is often 
highlighted that the test is over-inclusive. For example, where victims have 
been injured in accidents and transported to the hospital, and subsequently 
harmed due to medical malpractice,62 the French courts tend to link the 
victim’s ultimate harm to the initial accident, namely, the driver’s negligent 
act.63 But this criticism probably confuses the issue of causation with the 
distinct issue of legal responsibility.
Although the theory of the equivalence of the conditions has an un-
questionable influence on case law, it cannot be asserted that this theory 
has been consecrated in the French positive law, which does not seem to 
choose one approach over another. This is probably why the reform pro-
jects of French Tort Law, the Catala Draft,64 made no attempt to formulate 
a definition of causation (Article 1347 of the French Civil Code). The other 
project, the Terré Draft,65 states that the cause is any fact without which the 
damage would not have occurred while also specifying that such a fact 
must be susceptible of producing the damage “according to the ordinary 
course of things” (Article 10).66 Generally, civil law scholars and courts 
use the but for criterion for factual causation, although with various modi-
61. G’SELL-MACREZ, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 142, 185.
62. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 14, 1970, Bull. crim. 
1970, No. 23; RTD civ. 1970, 574 obs. G. Durry (Fr.). 
63. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Oct. 5, 2004, D. inf. rap.
2972. Contra Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 15, 1958 JCP G 
1959, II, 11026, note P. Esmein (Fr.). 
64. Draft Décret du 2008, Avant-Projet de Réforme Due Droit Des Obligations Et Du Droit De 
La Prescription, DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE (P. Catala ed., 2006). See also Proposals for Reform of 
the Law of Obligations and the Law of Prescription, MINISTÉRE DE LA JUSTICE (John Cartwright & 
Simon Whittaker trans., 2007), http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/rapportcatatla0905-anglais.pdf
[hereinafter Oxford Translation] (English version); HENRI CAPITANT ASSOC., AVANT-PROJET DE 
REFORME DU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS (ARTICLES 1101 À 1386 DU CODE CIVIL) ET DU DROIT DE LA 
PRESCRIPTION (ARTICLES 2234 À 2281 DU CODE CIVIL) (2008),
http://www.henricapitant.org/node/73 [hereinafter Capitant Translation].
65. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, POUR UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE (F. Terré 
ed., 2011).
66. See Oliver Moréteau, France: French Tort Law in the Light of European Harmonization, 6 J.
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fications in specific cases. Ingeborg Puppe has detailed the inadequacies of 
this approach and argued for the need to instead adopt a Millian covering 
law analysis.67
B. Causation Theories Based on the Covering Law Analysis
Legal theorists have been strongly influenced by Mill’s covering law 
analysis of causal laws and singular instances of causation. According to 
this approach, a fully described causal law lists all the conditions that to-
gether are necessary and sufficient, when fully instantiated on a specific 
occasion, for the occurrence of a certain consequence. This perspective is 
echoed in legal approaches to causal relationships in civil law countries and 
common law systems.
1. The Covering Law Perspective in Civil Law Countries
In civil law countries, the covering law analysis underlies not only the 
“equivalence of conditions” approach to factual causation, but also, by its 
reliance on causal (natural) laws, the theory of adequate causation. The 
theory of adequate causation was developed by German authors in the end 
of the nineteenth century68 as a theory of appropriate legal responsibility.
The adequacy theory belongs to the “generalizing theories” insofar as 
it selects “a particular condition as the cause of an event because it is of a 
kind which is connected with such events by a generalization or statement 
of regular sequence.”69 Carl Ludwig von Bar was the first scholar to devel-
op an account of the adequacy theory.70 For him, the determining cause of 
an ultimate event is the human action that altered the usual or ordinary 
course of events. “A man is in the legal sense the cause of an occurrence to 
the extent that he may be regarded as the condition by virtue of which what 
would be otherwise regarded as the regular course of events in human ex-
perience is altered.”71 This first account of the theory defines the adequate 
cause as an event that departs from the ordinary or regular course of events.
67. See, e.g., Ingeborg Puppe, Der Erfolg und seine kausale Erklärung im Strafrecht, 92 
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 863 (1980); Ingeborg Puppe, The Con-
cept of Causation in the Law, in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON “CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY” 67 (Ben-
edikt Kahmen & Markus Stepanians eds., 2013).
68. G’SELL-MACREZ, supra note 2, at ¶ 80.
69. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36, at 465.
70. L. VON BAR, DIE LEHRE VOM KAUSALZUSAMMENHANGE IM RECHTE, BESONDERS IM 
STRAFRECHTE (1871).
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Subsequently, other commentators like Ludwig Träger72 expressed the 
view that a condition is an adequate cause of a consequence if it tends to be 
followed by the result in question according to human experience and in 
the ordinary course of things. Träger’s formulation is still used in French 
treatises and manuals to define adequate causation. French authors consider 
that a condition is an adequate cause when it is likely to produce the effect 
according to the ordinary course of things and in light of the experience of 
everyday occurrences.73 It is also said that necessary antecedents can be 
described as adequate causes if they normally produce the harm, as op-
posed to mere occasions that have been followed by the result because of 
unforeseen and exceptional circumstances.74 That being said, the most so-
phisticated versions of the adequacy theory, although they are undoubtedly 
based on causal generalizations, appear to be closer to the probabilistic 
approaches of causation presented above.
2.. The Covering Law Perspective in Common Law Systems
In common law systems, the most widely accepted theories of causa-
tion derive from the Millian covering law model. That is the case with the 
approach developed by Hart and Honoré, which was adopted but restricted 
by John Mackie (INUS) and modified and extended by Richard Wright 
(NESS).
In 1959, Hart and Honoré published their seminal study Causation in 
the Law.75 The aim of their study was to examine how causal language was 
used in the law. They considered that law was concerned with “the plain 
man’s notions of causation”, i.e. the “common sense notion” of causation.76
Among the various notions they found, one was the concept of a “causally 
relevant factor”77 that is “necessary just in the sense that it is one of a set of 
conditions jointly sufficient for the production of the consequence.”78 In 
this respect, Hart and Honoré’s notion of a “causally relevant condi-
72. LUDWIG TRÄGER, DER KAUSALBEGRIFFE IM STRAF- UND ZIVILRECHT (1904); Duncan 
Fairgrieve & Florence G’Sell, Causation in French Law: Pragmatism and Policy, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CAUSATION 111, 118 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011).
73. PHILIPPE BRUN, RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE EXTRACONTRACTUELLE ¶ 227 (3e ed. 2014);
MURIEL FABRE-MAGNAN, 1 DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS, RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE ET QUASI-CONTRATS
(3e ed. 2013); PHILIPPE MALAURIE ET AL., DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS ¶ 92 (L.G.D.J. ed., 7e ed. 2015); 
FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS ¶ 860 (11e ed. 2013); PHILIPPE LE TOURNEAU,
DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ ET DES CONTRATS. REGIMES D’INDEMNISATION  2014-2015 ¶ 1716 (10e 
ed. 2014).
74. JEAN-LUC AUBERT ET AL., 2 LES OBLIGATIONS, LE FAIT JURIDIQUE ¶ 158 (13th ed. 2009).
75. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36.
76. Id. at 26.
77. Id. at 113. 
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tion” clearly relied on Mill’s idea that a fully described causal law lists all 
the conditions that together are necessary and sufficient for the occurrence 
of a certain consequence. The definition they gave is considered as “a ma-
jor advance in the analysis of causation, in both law and philosophy.”79 It 
expressed the view that, in a specific situation, a causally relevant condition 
is a necessary element of a set of conditions jointly and minimally suffi-
cient for the harmful outcome. In their account, necessity is described in its 
weakest sense: it merely requires that a condition be necessary for the suf-
ficiency of a set of actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence 
of the effect, rather than being always necessary (strict necessity) or neces-
sary for the effect in the singular instance (strong necessity).80
In 1965, Mackie published a well known analysis of Hart and 
Honoré’s contribution.81 He employed an acronym, INUS (for ‘insufficient 
but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition’), to describe 
the elements of a causal law, but, unlike Hart and Honoré, he adhered to the 
but for test in singular instances of causation.82
In 1985, Wright83 substantially revised and extended Hart and 
Honoré’s account of a causally relevant factor and used another acronym, 
NESS (for ‘Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set’), preferring its formula-
tion to the “INUS” suggested by Mackie. According to Wright, “a particu-
lar condition was a cause of a specific consequence if and only if it was a 
necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was suffi-
cient for the occurrence of the consequence.”84 As Puppe also insists, the 
NESS test is not presented as requiring a “counterfactual” analysis. Both 
Wright and Puppe insist that speculating on what might have happened in a 
hypothetical world where the specified factor is absent is unnecessary.85 It 
is only necessary to consider what has actually happened.
It is generally accepted in academic doctrines in common law jurisdic-
tions and by the courts in those jurisdictions which have been exposed to 
and understand the NESS account, that it is appropriate to use the NESS 
criterion when the but for test fails, as the more comprehensive test for 
79. Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 124
80. Id. at 123.
81. MACKIE, supra note 27.
82. Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 110.
83. Wright, supra note 52; Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal 
Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (2001); Richard W. 
Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425 (2003).
84. Wright, supra note 52, at 1774. 
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causation in its purely factual, scientific sense.86 This test has been adopted 
in the comments to sections 26 and 27 of the Restatement Third of Torts for
cases of causal overdetermination,87 which the NESS analysis, unlike the 
but for analysis, is precisely able to handle. In the common example of two 
persons who each simultaneously fire fatal shots at the deceased victim, 
each of the shots is a NESS causal condition because each is part of a com-
plete instantiation of a causal law that links shooting with dying. The same 
reasoning applies to preemption cases, for example in the case where Mr. X
died in a car accident while suffering from a serious disease that would 
have led him to death anyway.
While the NESS theory is generally accepted by academics and the 
few courts that have considered it as the most comprehensive test for cau-
sation, its creator claims that NESS is “the meaning of causation”.88 This 
claim has opened the door for criticism,89 particularly because the NESS 
test is dependent on external causal laws.90 Richard Fumerton and Ken 
Kress have highlighted the fact that the NESS test presupposes determin-
ism91 and questioned both the utility of the concept92 and its ability to solve 
overdetermination cases.93 Above all, they pointed out what they call a 
“vicious conceptual circularity”94 since the NESS test depends on external 
causal laws. They reached the conclusion that the concept of NESS cannot 
express the very meaning of causation.95 Nevertheless, many commentators 
agree that the NESS test has practical value and can serve as a device to
86. Stapleton, supra note 6, at 1256; Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 130–31.
87. “If multiple acts occur, each of which under § 26 alone would have been a factual cause of the 
physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause 
of the harm.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 27 (AM. LAW. INST. 2005).
88. Wright, supra note 52, at 1802.
89. Richard Fumerton & Ken Kress, Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency and 
Causal Sufficiency, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (2001); Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean 
by “Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 433 (2008). 
90. In Wright’s own terms, “causal law is a law of nature, it describes an empirically based, 
invariable, nonprobabilistic relation between some minimal set of abstractly described antecedent 
conditions and some abstractly described consequent condition, such that the concrete instantiation of 
all the antecedent conditions will always immediately result in the concrete instantiation of the conse-
quent condition. Any concrete condition that is part of the instantiation of the completely instantiated 
antecedent of the causal law is a cause of (contributed to) the instantiation of the consequent.” Richard 
W. Wright, Proving Facts: Belief versus Probability, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, supra note 72,
at 91, http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/709.
91. Fumerton & Kress, supra note 89, at 97.
92. Id. at 98–99.
93. Id. at 100.
94. Id. at 84.
95. Richard Wright replied to those criticisms in Richard W. Wright, The NESS Account of 
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determine whether a specified factor was involved in the occurrence of the 
damage.96
In recent years, some jurists, although influenced by the NESS theory, 
have preferred intuitive  approaches which employ notions of “involve-
ment” (Jane Stapleton) or “substantial contribution” (Michael Moore).97
The notion of “involvement” is promoted by Stapleton as expressing the 
most convenient choice for the law when dealing with causal language. 
According to Stapleton, it is necessary to make “a choice of underlying 
interrogation (blame, explanation, physical role, any sort of involvement 
etc.)”98 so that it is clear what information lawyers are reporting when they 
use causal language for legal purposes.99 In this perspective, it is the notion 
of “involvement” that is appropriate. Such a notion “identifies that there is 
a contrast between the actual world and some hypothetical world from 
which we exclude (at least)” a specified factor,100 which expresses that 
“while in the former world the phenomenon exists, in the latter it does 
not.”101 “Involvement” must be determined by “objective data (our 
knowledge of the physical laws of nature, evidence of behaviour, and so 
on)” and is thus untainted by normative issues.102 In this respect, the notion 
of involvement relies on a relationship of necessity and is therefore, to a 
certain extent, a version of the counterfactual approach. However, Staple-
ton’s concept of “involvement” is also closely related to Hart and Honoré’s 
notion of a “causally relevant condition.”103 This is why Stapleton admits 
that the NESS test appears to be very convenient for identifying the rela-
tionships of involvement, even though she denies that NESS could express 
the real meaning of causation in the law.104
C. Probabilistic Causation in the Law
Probabilistic approaches to causation, which are especially popular 
among efficiency theorists, have influenced legal scholars willing to take 
into account the fact that causal generalizations generally describe what 
usually or often happens rather than what always happens. Probabilities are 
96. Stapleton, supra note 6, at 1256.
97. Moore, supra note 25 passim.
98. Stapleton, supra note 6, at 1223–24; Stapleton, supra note 89, at 439.
99. Stapleton, supra note 89, at 439.
100. Stapleton, supra note 6, at 1217.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1228.
103. Id. at 1240–41.
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also used in the law of evidence, in order to express the various degrees of 
uncertainty affecting causal relations.
1. The Probabilistic Analysis of Legal Causation
Philosophically speaking, the probabilistic theories of causation were 
developed in order to take into account the fact that causal laws as we 
know them generally are actually indeterministic. Every smoker does not 
suffer from lung cancer but a smoker has an increased probability of devel-
oping lung cancer in comparison with a non-smoker. In this respect, proba-
bilistic theories are mainly theories of causal relations between types of 
events: they express general causal relationships in a world where causal 
laws are mostly indeterministic. Yet, the probabilistic approach may also 
be extended to cover causal relationships between particular events. For 
example, it may be asserted that Mr. Gourlain being a smoker raised the 
probability of his suffering from lung cancer. Then it arguably may be con-
cluded that Mr. Gourlain’s lung cancer is due to his smoking. Both aspects 
of the probabilistic approach can be found in the law of torts.
For instance, in civil law countries, the adequacy theory (which, how-
ever, is a theory of legal responsibility for actually caused consequences) is 
often presented in probabilistic terms. According to Johannes von Kries,105
who expanded von Bar’s theory, a given fact can be considered to be the 
adequate cause of the damage if and only if it has significantly increased 
the objective probability of occurrence of the damage.106 This test of objec-
tive probability thereby allows one to distinguish an adequate cause from 
only incidental or accidental factors contributing to the injury. Träger also 
highlighted that a condition may be considered as an adequate cause of a 
consequence if it has increased significantly the degree of probability of 
harm. The theory involves linking concrete facts to general causal connec-
tions in order to assess the likelihood of damage in the absence/presence of 
the factor considered. Within this framework, the adequacy theory is able 
to establish a hierarchy between different factors based on the increased 
probability of the outcome. The factor that increased the probability of 
damage by, say, 30% (all other things being equal) is more “adequate” than 
the factor which increased the probability of such an outcome by only 15%. 
Nevertheless, the idea of probability is rarely mentioned in France. For 
most French lawyers, a factor is an adequate cause when it usually produc-
es the effect by the normal course of things.107
105. J. VON KRIES, VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE 12 (1882).
106. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36, at 469.
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In common law countries, the probabilistic approach of legal causa-
tion is mainly advocated by legal economists.108 Indeed, the probabilistic 
account appears indispensable to the efficiency theory of tort law which 
defines the primary objective of civil liability as minimizing accident costs. 
In this perspective, the party that could prevent the accident with a lower 
cost than the expected harm arising from the accident should be held lia-
ble.109 In the absence of transaction costs, if the expected harm exceeds the 
cost of preventing it, those who can be expected to suffer from the accident 
will conclude an agreement with the one who can avoid the damage at the 
lowest cost in order to avoid the accident. In the presence of transaction 
costs, it is for the law to make the “cheapest cost avoider” pay for the acci-
dent. In other words, it is the “cheapest cost avoider” of the injury that 
should be considered as having caused the injury. Within this context, Gui-
do Calabresi110 distinguished the but for test from a probabilistic test that 
he called “causal link”: an act is causally linked to an injury if it increases 
the probability of its occurrence. This probabilistic linkage concept, some-
times called “ prospective causation” because it is forward-looking,111 is 
presented by legal economists as an alternative notion of causation that 
should be adopted in order to identify the “cheapest cost avoider”. There-
fore, it is the probabilistic approach of causation, which is embodied in 
Judge Learned Hand’s formula, that should be used in tort law.
To sum up, in the probabilistic perspective, a condition is a cause of 
some result if it increased the probability that the result would occur. This 
probabilistic increased-risk concept uses ex ante causal probabilities that 
are abstract and independent of the particularistic evidence specific to a 
particular occasion. This use of ex ante probabilities can be criticized on 
the grounds that ex ante causal probabilities are better suited for causal 
prediction of what might happen than for causal explanation of what actual-
ly happened. In order to explain what happened and to determine liability, 
it seems more appropriate to rely on probabilities expressing the most like-
108. Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 644, 644–52 (Bouckaert & G. Degeest eds., 2000), reprinted with updates in TORT LAW 
AND ECONOMICS: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 83–108 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009);
see also Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analy-
sis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985).
109. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 110 (1983); see also WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 228–55 (1987).
110. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975). 
111. Ben-Shahar, supra note 108, at 646–47. See also Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation 
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ly causal chain, or, in other words, a certain degree of belief. In this respect, 
probabilities appear to be better suited for solving evidence issues than for 
defining the very notion of causation.
2. Probabilities in the Law of Evidence
Although we have so far dealt with objective probabilities that express 
the likelihood of a specific occurrence, another kind of probability may be 
used in the law of evidence in order to formulate a certain degree of belief. 
Such subjective probabilities are not intended to render the frequency of a 
given phenomenon but to reflect a state of belief or a certain degree of 
(un)certainty. “Ex post probabilities“112 may be established, after the effect 
occurred, in order to express a judgment on what actually happened on a 
particular occasion. For example, there may be a 75% probability that the 
statement “Mr. Gourlain’s lung cancer resulted from his smoking” is true.
In common law systems, the law of evidence uses a “standard of per-
suasion,”113 which is usually referred to as the “balance of probability” or, 
in the United States, the “preponderance of the evidence”. Most scholars 
and courts interpret the “preponderance of the evidence” standard as mean-
ing “more likely than not” or “more probably true than not”.114 Especially 
with the first interpretation, it is often thought that the standard requires 
using a probabilistic test that requires a greater than fifty percent probabil-
ity that the facts at issue are true. For example, since it must be established 
that it is more probable than not that Mr. Gourlain’s lung cancer is due to 
his smoking, there should be a greater than 50% probability that smoking 
caused his disease. However, it has been argued that the probability does 
not refer to a mere aggregate class-based frequency but rather to some min-
imal level of belief which is founded on the concrete evidence specific to 
the situation provided by the parties and the court’s general knowledge.115
In a civil law country like France, the use of probabilities does not ap-
pear as natural as it is in common law systems. In French Law, causation is 
considered as a legal fact (“fait juridique”) that can be proved by all means 
(“par tous moyens”). In most cases, courts use presumptive evidence pro-
vided for by Article 1349 of the Civil Code that defines presumptions as 
“the consequences that a statute or the court draws from a known fact to an 
112. Wright, supra note 90, at 93.
113. Id. at 79.
114. Id. at 88, ¶ 30.
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unknown fact.”116 Specifically, Article 1353 of the Civil Code provides that 
presumptions “are left to the insight and carefulness of the judges, who 
shall only admit serious, precise, and concurrent presumptions.”117 Since 
the standard of proof is provided for by a legal provision, the Cour de cas-
sation controls the arguments used by judges to justify the admission or 
rejection of a causal link. In the Hepatitis B vaccine litigation, the Cour de 
cassation has thus recognized that the alleged causal relationship between 
the vaccine and the outbreak of multiple sclerosis could be established by 
serious, precise and concurrent presumptions,118 which is also accepted by 
the Conseil d’Etat.119 Thus, it was found that the short delay between the 
injection of the vaccine and the appearance of the symptoms of the disease 
as well as the lack of any predisposing factor were sufficient grounds to 
admit the existence of a causal relationship, despite the scientific uncertain-
ty. Very recently, the Cour de cassation has decided to submit a prelimi-
nary question to the European Court of Justice. The question dealt with the 
compatibility of such a method of proof with Article 4 of the Council Di-
rective 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, reg-
116. “Des conséquences que la loi ou le magistrat tire d’un fait connu à un fait inconnu.” CODE 
CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1349 (Fr.). 
117. “Sont abandonnées aux lumières et à la prudence du magistrat, qui ne doit admettre que des 
présomptions graves, précises et concordantes.” CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1353 (Fr.).
118. Cour de cassation (Cass.) [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 22, 2008, Bull civ. 
I, No. 06-10-967, Recueil-Dalloz [D.] 2008 A.J. 1544 obs. I. Gallmeister (Fr.) and 2894, obs. P. Brun & 
P. Jourdain; RDSS 2008. 578, obs. J. Peigné; Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (RTD civ.) 2008. 492, 
obs. P. Jourdain; Revue trimestrielle de droit commercial (RTD com.) 2009. 200, obs. B. Bouloc; JCP 
2008, II, 10131, note Grynbaum, JCP I 186, No. 3, obs. Stoffel-Munck; Revue des contrats [RDC] 
2008. 1186, obs. J.S. Borghetti; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re civ.,
Jan. 22, 2009, No. 07-16.449, D. 2009, 429; Revue de Droit Sanitaire et Social (RDSS) 2009 367, obs. 
J. Peigné; RTD civ. 2009. 329, obs. P. Jourdain; RCA 2009, No. 58, note Radé; RDC 2009. 1028, note 
Deshayes; Sept. 24, 2009, No. 08-16.097, D. 2009. 2426, obs. I. Gallmeister; RTD com. 2010. 414, obs. 
B. Bouloc; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 25, 2010, No.
09-16.556; D. 2010. 2909, obs. I. Gallmeister; D. 2011. 316, chron. P. Brun, D. 2565, obs. A. Laude,
D. 2891, obs. P. Delebecque, J.-D. Bretzner et I. Gelbard-Le Dauphin; RDSS 2011. 164, obs. J. Peigné; 
RTD civ. 2011. 134, obs. P. Jourdain; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re
civ., May, 29 2013, No. 12-20.903, D. 2013. 1717, obs. I. Gallmeister, note J.- S. Borghetti, D. 1723, 
note P. Brun, D. 2014. 47, obs. P. Brun and O. Gout; RTD civ. 2013. 625, obs. P. Jourdain; RTD com. 
2013. 797, obs. B. Bouloc; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re civ., July 
10, 2013, No. 12-21.314, Dalloz actualité, July 25, 2013, obs. T. Douville; D. 2013. 2311 and 2306, 
avis C. Mellottée and 2312, note P. Brun and 2315, note J.-S. Borghetti, D. 2014. 47, obs. P. Brun and 
O. Gout D. 563, chron. C. Capitaine et I. Darret-Courgeon, D. 2021, obs. A. Laude; RDSS 2013. 938, 
obs. J. Peigné; RTD civ. 2013. 852, obs. P. Jourdain; RCA 2013. et 6, Bakouche; JCP 2013, No. 1012, 
note Parance.
119. Conseil d’Etat (CE) Mar. 9, 2007, No. 267635 (Schwartz); AJDA 2007. 861, concl. T. Olson; 
D. 2007. 2204, obs. E. Pahlawan-Sentilhes, note L. Neyret; D. 2897, obs. P. Brun et P. Jourdain; RDSS 
2007. 543, obs. D. Cristol; Mar. 9, 2007, No. 278665 (Commune de Grenoble); AJDA 2007. 861, concl. 
T. Olson; RDSS 2007. 543, obs. D. Cristol; Conseil d’Etat (CE) Mar. 9, 2007, No. 285288 (Thomas); 
AJDA 2007. 861, concl. T. Olson; JCP 2007 II 10142, note Laude; July 24, 2009, No. 308876; AJDA 
2009. 1466; RDSS 2009. 962, obs. D. Cristol; JCP 2009, No. 223, obs. M.C.R.; RDC 2010. 79, obs. 
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ulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
liability for defective products.120
While the French standard is not, as such, probabilistic, French courts 
use probabilistic reasoning in order to compensate the uncertainty of causal 
judgments. For instance, the concept of loss of chance is widely used,121
especially in medical malpractice cases.122 That being said, probabilities 
could also be used beyond the well-known use of the concept of loss of 
chance in order to compensate for a lack of evidence, for example in multi-
ple-exposure cases (asbestos and cigarette-smoking cases) or in alternative-
causation cases (DES cases). The idea is to impose liability for a propor-
tionate share of the injury, based on each defendant’s contribution to the 
total risk that led to the injury. In the DES litigation, the Cour de cassation
has decided to reverse the burden of proof for the benefit of victims123 in 
cases where the defendant could not be specifically identified because two 
different pharmaceutical companies had marketed the DES. Therefore, if 
the victim proves that his/her injury results from exposure to DES, then 
he/she can be compensated by every DES manufacturer or even by all DES 
manufacturers, jointly and severally (responsibility in solidum). Then the 
manufacturer who compensated the victim can exercise a recourse action 
against the other manufacturers. In the DES litigation, the Cour d’appel de 
Paris has decided that the burden of compensating the victims should be 
spread equally among the jointly liable producers, despite the fact that both 
producers had significantly different market shares.124 However, the Tribu-
nal de Grande Instance de Nanterre has, on the contrary, ruled that each 
producer’s contribution should be determined in proportion to their respec-
120. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 12, 2015, 14-
18118.
121. G’SELL-MACREZ, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 455–57; See also J. Boré, L’indemnisation pour les 
chances perdues, une forme d’appréciation quantitative de la causalité d’un fait dommageable, JCP G.
1974, I, 2620; G. Mémeteau, Perte de chances et responsabilité médicale, Gaz. Pal. 1997, 2, 1367 (Fr.).
122. In a seminal case, a doctor had committed an error of diagnosis on a child who remained 
crippled. The judges condemned the doctor to pay damages for the loss of “chances of cure”. Cour de 
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re civ., Dec. 14, 1965, JCP G. 1966, II, 14753, 
note R. Savatier (Fr.); See also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re civ.,
Jan. 27, 1970, 31, Bull. civ. I No. 37, JCP G. 1970, II, 16422, note Rabut G. (Fr.); VINEY & P.
JOURDAIN, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL, SOUS LA DIRECTION DE JACQUES GHESTIN, LES CONDITIONS DE LAT
RESPONSABILITÉ ¶ 370 (2e ed. 1999).
123. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1 re civ., Sept. 24 , 2009, No. 
08-10.081 and No. 08-16.305, D. 2009. AJ 2342, obs. Gallmeister; D. 2010. Pan. 49, obs. Brun; JCP G. 
2009. 304 obs. Mistretta; JCP G. 383, note Hocquet-Berg; RLDC 2009/65, No. 3605, obs. Bugnicourt; 
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme Court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 28, 2010, 08-18837 (Fr.).
124. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, pôle 2, 2e ch., Oct. 26, 2012, No. 
10/18297: D. 2012, 2859, note C. Quétand-Finet. See S. Ferey et F. G’sell, Pour une prise en compte 
des parts de marché dans la détermination de la contribution à la dette de réparation. A propos de l’arrêt 
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tive market shares.125 There is currently an intense debate on the subject in 
the French commentary.126
Finally, it cannot be said that French jurists have never developed 
sophisticated approaches of the concept of causation in the law of civil 
liability. They have rather used the theories elaborated by German authors 
in order to promote pragmatic solutions. It is on this basis that French 
courts are now developing appropriate responses to the difficult issues 
posed by the need to prove the causal link with sufficient certainty. 
125. Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] Nanterre, 2e ch., Apr. 10, 2014, No. 12/12349 and 
12/13064; Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] Nanterre, May 22, 2014, No. 12/12339: JCP G. 2014, 678, 
note J. Dubarry; D. 2014, 1434, obs. J.-S. Borghetti. 
126. N. Molfessis, Du critère des parts de marché comme prétendu remède à l’incertitude sur 
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